We exploit a dataset that includes the individual tax returns of all taxpayers in the top percentile of the income distribution in Germany to pin down the effective income taxation of households with very high incomes. Taking tax base erosion into account, we find that the top percentile of the income distribution pays an effective average tax rate of 30.5% and contributes more than a quarter of total income tax revenue. Within the top percentile, the effective average tax rate is first increasing, then decreasing, with income. Since the 1990s, effective average tax rates for the German super-rich have fallen by about a third, with major reductions occurring in the wake of the personal income tax reform of 2001-05. As a result, the concentration of net incomes at the very top of the distribution has strongly increased in Germany.
INTRODUCTION
Before the recent financial crisis, income concentration was on the rise in several countries (Atkinson and Piketty, 2010) . Median incomes stagnated, while top incomes experienced vigorous growth. Meanwhile, public deficits that were incurred to fight the crisis have brought about public debts of unprecedented heights. In such a situation, increasing tax revenues by a heavier taxation of top incomes is an often discussed policy option. In academic research, the taxation of top incomes has mainly been the object of studies devoted to the U.S. (e.g. Feenberg and Poterba, 2000; Piketty and Saez, 2007; Slemrod, 1994) . Our paper aims to inform that discussion by an in-depth analysis of the effective taxation of top incomes in Germany.
To appreciate the margins for an enhanced taxation of top incomes, one has to assess the extent to which those incomes are actually taxed, how effective taxation had evolved before the crisis, and how the taxation of very-high income taxpayers compares to the taxation of the rest of the population. Coping with those issues involves two main challenges. First, legislated tax rates do not contain sufficient information to determine the effective burden of income taxation. One has to take into account the pattern and the size of tax base erosion triggered by tax exemptions, deductions, and various loopholes in the tax code. Furthermore, one has to consider how the liabilities of the personal income tax (PIT) interact with those of other taxes, notably those affecting corporations. Second, a meaningful analysis of the taxation of households with very high incomes must contrast taxation of high incomes with that of the remaining population. Only by comparing effective average tax rates across income groups over time, can one assess the extent of true progressivity and appreciate the extent to which the distributional impact of income taxation has evolved. Ideally, a dataset is needed that covers the entire household population, from the very poor to the very rich. Lang et al. (1997) investigated effective tax progressivity in Germany using data from the income and consumption survey of 1983. Their estimations suggest that the effective marginal tax rate for high incomes lies 16 percentage points below the legislated one, with much of that difference being due to tax avoidance by means of interest income and income from real assets. They also found that the effective tax rate is increasing with income, although the increase of the tax rate was shown to be negligible at high income levels. However, Lang et al. (1997) are mute about the taxation of top incomes, as their dataset does not include households within the richest 2% of the population. That group is included in the analysis of Bach et al. (2009) . However, in contrast to the current paper, that article is devoted to describing the distribution of market income at the individual level and is not concerned with the taxation of households at the top of the income distribution.
This paper addresses both challenges mentioned above. On the basis of a very rich integrated dataset and detailed micro-simulations, we conduct an in-depth assessment of the taxation of top incomes in Germany from 1992 to 2005, a period of major tax reforms that affected both households and firms. The focus of our analysis is on the taxation of households in the top percentile of the income distribution. As our dataset includes all taxpayers in that top percentile, we can determine the effective taxation of top fractiles as small as the top 0.0001 percentile, i.e., the 46 income-richest households in Germany.
Our main results on income taxation at the top percentile of the German income distribution are as follows. First, the effective average tax rate paid by the top percentile equaled, in 2005, about two thirds of its statutory tax rate. This notwithstanding, the effective average tax rate of the top percentile is much higher than the one paid by the top decile of the distribution which, in turn, is higher than the average tax rates paid by the lower deciles. Second, and quite surprisingly, effective tax progressivity vanishes within the top percentile of the income distribution. The effective average tax rate peaks at the level of the top 0.1% group and then gently declines. Third, the top percentile contributes about one quarter of the overall income tax revenue, and that share did not change much from 1992 to 2005. Fourth, in the wake of the major PIT reform of the period 2001-05, the effective average tax rate of the top percentile decreased, and that decrease was especially pronounced for the super-rich. Taxation of top incomes became lighter precisely when pre-tax income concentration was on the rise. 1 Both this change in tax policy and the increase of top gross incomes generated a substantial increase in the concentration of net income. Fifth, adding the local business tax to the income tax liability raises the effective tax rate of the top percentile by about 3.5 percentage points. However, it qualitatively changes neither our results regarding effective tax progressivity nor those about the evolution of effective tax rates over time.
In the next section we provide some background information on the taxation of household income in Germany. Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 explains the gross income concept we use and how to measure it. Section 5 is the core of the paper, where our main results are presented and discussed. Section 6 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Macroeconomic developments
From 1992 to 2005, German real GDP per employed person increased by 16% (see Table A1 of the web appendix at http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/en/ institute/wirtschaftspolitik-geschichte/steiner/index.html). Following unification of East and West Germany on 3 October 1990, a short-lived economic boom occurred, after which the German economy experienced a long period of slow economic growth. The modest increase in GDP per employed person in this period was accompanied by a slight reduction in the number of persons in dependent employment, while the number of self-employed persons increased by more than 20%. The unemployment rate, as measured according to the harmonized OECD definition, increased from 6.2% in 1992 to 10.6% in 2005. Labor's share in German national income declined by 5.5 percentage points between 1992 and 2005, from 72.2% to 66.7%. While entrepreneurial and property income increased by about 60% in nominal terms between 1992 and 2005, employees' compensation increased only by some 20% in this period.
In the wake of reunification, regional income disparities between the Länder of the former GDR and the West German Länder became less pronounced. Starting from less than half of the West German level in 1992, real GDP per employed person in East Germany increased to more than two thirds of the West German level in 2005. Convergence was especially rapid during the first half of the 1990s (see Table A1 of the web appendix). The east-west ratio of gross average wage income increased from 62% to 78%, with most of this increase occurring between 1992 and 1995. However, employment in East Germany relative to West Germany declined, while the unemployment rate in East Germany remained at roughly twice the West German level throughout the period. These developments were accompanied by a marked increase in income inequality in East Germany in the first few years after reunification, which was mainly driven by an increase in wage inequality (Burda and Hunt, 2001; Franz and Steiner, 2000) .
The tax schedule is progressive and includes a basic allowance. Incomes that exceed the basic allowance are subject to a marginal tax rate that increases linearly with income, up to a threshold. For incomes higher than that threshold, the marginal tax rate stays constant. Thus, the statutory average tax rate converges towards the top marginal tax rate with increasing taxable income. Single taxpayers are taxed according to the tax schedule for individuals. Married couples are taxed jointly under income splitting: the couple's tax liability equals twice the tax liability of a single taxpayer whose income is half of the couple's income. Figure 1 displays the statutory marginal and average tax rates for single persons between 1992 and 2005; evidence on previous decades can be found in Corneo (2005) . During those years, the top statutory marginal tax rates were reduced from 53% to 42%. 2 The lowest marginal tax rate was increased from 19% in 1992 to 25.9% in 1998 and subsequently reduced to 15% in 2005. This was accompanied by increases in the basic allowance, notably a doubling of the basic allowance in 1996. In 1991-92, a solidarity surcharge tax amounting to 3.75% of the PIT amount was introduced, briefly suspended in 1993, subsequently re-introduced at a 7.5% rate in 1995, and reduced in 1998 to the current level of 5.5% of the PIT liability. [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] The effective taxation of top personal incomes is significantly affected by the rules of company taxation. In Germany, owners of unincorporated companies are subject to the PIT, in contrast to corporations, which are subject to a corporate income tax. Along with tax cuts for corporations, the German parliament reduced the tax burden of unincorporated companies by means of tax rate ceilings that apply to income from business enterprise (Tarifbegrenzung für gewerbliche Einkünfte). The Location Preservation Act (Standortsicherungsgesetz), which became effective as of 1994, reduced the corporate tax rate for retained profits from 50% to 45%. By the same Act, the general top marginal PIT rate of 53% was reduced to 47% for earnings from business enterprise.
The Tax Relief Act 1999 /2002 further reduced the corporate tax rate on retained profits to 40%. It also capped the top marginal PIT rate for incomes from business enterprise to 45% in 1999 and to 43% in 2000. The general top marginal tax rate for all other personal incomes still amounted to 53% in 1999. It was then reduced to 51% in 2000, to 48.5% in 2001, to 45% in 2004, and to 42% in 2005 . The Tax Relief Act also introduced some complementary measures to partly compensate the reduction of tax rates. Those measures included restrictions concerning loss offsets across incomes from different sources, more restrictive rules for the assessment of provisions in the insurance and nuclear energy industries, and restrictions for current-value depreciations. Furthermore, the so-called co-entrepreneurship decree, which facilitated tax-neutral transfers of individual assets between partners and their partnerships, was temporarily abolished. The reform also replaced the cap on the top marginal PIT rate on the business income referred to above with a partial credit against the local business tax, deductible from the PIT. The Corporation Tax Reform Act 2000 (Steuersenkungsgesetz) reduced the corporate income tax rate on both retained and distributed profits to 25%. By the same legislation, the former imputation system was replaced by a classical system with shareholder relief: the so-called half-income system. Under the full imputation system, corporate profits that are distributed as dividends are taxed at the same rate as retained profits, while dividends are taxed at the shareholder's PIT rate with an allowance for the tax paid at the corporate level. Under the half-income system, distributed and retained profits are taxed at the same rate of 25%, with half of the distributed profits being tax-exempt at the personal level. The half-income system was also applied to the taxation of capital gains.
Local business tax
In Germany, firms are subject to a local business tax ('Gewerbesteuer'). That tax is meant to compensate local jurisdictions for the infrastructure they make available to firms. The revenues from that tax constitute a major source of finance for local governments (Fossen and Bach, 2008) . The local business tax was formerly levied on a broader base of the firm's value added and equity, but has evolved towards a tax on business income over the years. Today, the main item of its base is the operating profit attributed to the local jurisdiction. It is augmented by parts of the financing expenses, which represent the remainder of the former comprehensive taxation of business income. Income from agriculture, forestry, and professional services is not part of the tax base. Unincorporated firms benefit from a yearly allowance of 24,500 euros and reduced basic federal tax rates, up Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany to a taxable income of 72,500 euros. The local municipalities apply their own tax rate to the firms' local tax base. In 2005, the marginal tax rates on taxable income ranged from nine to almost 20%; the nationwide average was about 16.5%. Since 2001, sole proprietors and partners of non-incorporated firms can credit parts of the local business tax against their PIT liability. Notice that dividend income distributed by domestic corporations is also burdened with local business tax at the company level.
Tax exemptions
In Germany, tax saving opportunities multiplied in the wake of re-unification, when a number of special depreciation allowances and tax reliefs were enacted. In particular, generous accounting rules for business capital formation and investment in real estate in East Germany were introduced at that time, which allowed for offsets against income from other sources. Furthermore, between 1992 and 1998, most forms of capital gains from business activities were taxed at half the rate of the then prevailing PIT rate. Capital gains from financial investments were taxable only if realized within certain time periods. The tax reforms launched by the German government since the late 1990s were advertised partly as an attempt to curtail massive tax expenditures and to broaden the tax base.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our empirical investigation is based on the official income tax return (ITR) data for re-unified Germany for the years 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2005 , available at the research data centres of the German statistical offices (http:// www.forschungsdatenzentren.de/en/index.asp). For each of those cross sections, the ITR data includes a representative sample of about 3 million tax returns, i.e., roughly 10% of the entire taxpayer population. Samples for each of the first four of these cross-sections are drawn by the German Federal Statistical Office from the set of all tax files of each year so as to build a stratified random sample. The sampling fraction for pre-defined cells, according to gross taxable income and other tax-relevant characteristics, is determined by minimizing the standard error with respect to taxable income. Tax return samples include all taxpayers with high incomes or high income losses.
The method of construction of the official tax data has changed over time, particularly in 2004. Before 2004, there was no electronic data transfer of the wage-tax returns from employers to the fiscal authorities, and wage-tax returns of non-filers were incompletely included in the German income tax statistics. Computations for 2004, the first year in which the electronic data transfer was fully implemented, revealed the existence of about six million non-filing taxpayers that had paid about 14.5 billion euros (including the solidarity surcharge tax) in wage taxes. The 2005 data does not include those wage-tax returns of nonfilers since it was provided by the fiscal authorities directly to the Federal Statistical Office. In order to take such sample changes into account, we have employed a data integration strategy that homogenizes the empirical base of our computations across years. That strategy will be described shortly.
The original data set includes all assessed taxpayers, i.e., single persons or married couples who filed a tax return in a given year. Slightly more than 50% of all tax returns are joint files of married couples. Assuming that one taxpayer corresponds to one household, about three households out of four file an ITR in Germany. Whilst the ITR data accurately portrays the upper range of the income distribution in Germany, it is not representative of the lower tail of the income distribution and it is also missing a non-negligible share of taxpayers from the middle. In particular, households living on social assistance or income replacement benefits usually do not file unless they have other taxable income. Furthermore, households receiving only wage income file a tax return only if they want to claim itemized deductions that are not already taken into account by their wage tax, which is withheld at source by the employer.
A possible approach to account for those omissions in tax return data was suggested by Piketty and Saez (2003) and applied by Dell (2005) to German taxreturn data grouped by income intervals. Their approach consists of identifying the fractiles of the income distribution on the basis of the total number of potential tax units. That approach assumes that all non-filers can be placed at the lower tail of the gross income distribution. As mentioned above, this assumption is not applicable for Germany because of the relatively large number of non-filers with labor income only. Furthermore, the regulations concerning the provisions for filing tax returns were changed by the tax reform of 1996, a reform that did not only affect people at the bottom of the income distribution. Therefore, we follow a more systematic approach: we statistically match the ITR data with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) Study for the same years so as to account for non-filers. As a result, a comprehensive picture of the entire income distribution is obtained, from the very poor to the very rich.
The SOEP is an annual survey of households in Germany that offers detailed information on incomes, both at the individual and household level (Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005) . SOEP data sets are available at http://www.diw.de/en/ diw_02.c.222829.en/access.html. Information on individual and household gross incomes, as well as income components, is collected retrospectively in each wave for the previous year. The sample size is much smaller than that of the ITR. For example, in 2005 about 11,400 households were interviewed. Nevertheless, the SOEP represents a larger share of the population than the ITR since it also includes people who do not file tax returns. Starting in 2002 (S-wave), the SOEP includes a disproportionately large sample of 'high-income' households. This so-called high-income sample consists of over 1,200 households with monthly net incomes of at least 3,750 euros. Although the implied level of gross income puts all members of that sample in the top 20% of the gross income distribution, only very few of them belong to the top percentile. As a result, top incomes cannot be precisely examined on the basis of the SOEPthe SOEP remains, however, a very good data source for investigating the rest of the income distribution.
Our matching approach combines the ITR with the SOEP. For each person in the SOEP, a matching function selects a number of similar persons in the ITR data base, the number being determined by the relation of the respective weighting factors in the two data sets. Similarity is defined by a distance function using several personal characteristics observed in both datasets. As explained in Bach et al. (2009, Appendix 2) , we match conditionally on variables such as main income Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany source, occupational status, marital status, age group, family type and number of children. Since the ITR data contain a smaller subset of the population than the SOEP, not all individuals in the SOEP can be matched to the appropriate number of their 'statistical twins' in the ITR. After all observations in the ITR data are exhausted by this matching algorithm, we include all unmatched individuals from the SOEP in the ITR data so as to generate an integrated ITR-SOEP data set. Thereby, not only individuals who have no or little income, and therefore do not pay income tax, are added, but also those taxpayers with higher incomes who do not file tax returns. Detailed income information about these individuals is available in the SOEP, from which the individual PIT is calculated using a microsimulation model (Schwarze, 1995) . As reported in Table A2 of the web appendix, between 1992 and 2001, the number of assessed taxpayers remained fairly constant at about 29 millions. Then, it jumped to 35 millions in 2004 and subsequently decreased to less than 27 millions in 2005. The matching approach we use adjusts for those large changes in the number of non-filers.
As already mentioned, we are interested in assessing how the local business tax impinges upon the taxation of top incomes. That tax is not observed in the ITR data for the years before 2001, for which we have simulated it. Our simulation is based on the observed incomes from business enterprise as well as on dividend incomes. We impute interest expenses on long-term debt as well as other deductions and additions stipulated by the tax code using data from the local business tax statistics. For partnerships, we estimate the profit of the firm by imputing the average number of shareholders to account for the allowance and the tax progression that only applies to the entire firm. Starting with 2001, the local business tax base is reported in the ITR data because of the related tax credit. A comparison of reported and simulated average values of the base of the local business tax for those years suggests that our simulation model is successful. Since there is no reliable information on the regional distribution of shareholders, we estimate the assessed amount of local business tax for each shareholder by applying the average multiplier rate. The amount of local business tax levied on distributed dividend income at the corporate level is estimated by applying the implied average local business tax rate to business income before taxes.
MEASURING GROSS INCOME
In principle, German tax law employs a comprehensive notion of income, which includes all earned income and capital income. However, exemptions and various types of tax relief create a substantial gap between taxable income and gross income. In order to obtain a measure of economic income, we adjust taxable income by adding all tax-exempted incomes and tax reliefs, as well as by accounting for various tax avoidance strategies that can be identified in our data.
In the subsequent analysis, we distinguish amongst the following income components:
2 income from business activity includes taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from unincorporated business enterprise, and from self-employed activities, including professional services; 3 capital income includes interest and dividends as well as incomes from renting and leasing; 4 income from capital gains as realized from sale of an enterprise, parts of an enterprise, or shares of investors with substantial shareholdings, or if classified as speculation gains by German tax law; 5 transfer income includes unemployment benefits, social assistance, housing benefits, the child benefit, old-age pensions, the taxable share of life annuity funds (pure interest portion of the annuity payment), and alimonies between separated or divorced spouses.
German tax returns record adjusted gross income (Summe der Einkünfte), which is obtained by adding positive incomes from all mentioned sources and deducting losses. 3 Income from business activities and capital income are defined with various related expenses deducted. From that income measure, we compute economic gross income by adding together all tax-exempted incomes as well as tax reliefs that can be identified in our integrated data base, as described in more detail in the web appendix. We also adjust the incomes from dividends, as required by the change from the full-imputation system to the classical corporation income tax, with half-income taxation of dividends at the shareholder level in subsequent years. Until 2001, distributed gross dividends are recorded in our data, whereas dividends for the subsequent years are recorded with the corporate income tax of 25% deducted. Hence, we adjust dividend income in that year by multiplying recorded net dividends by the factor 4/3. Moreover, we disregard losses from renting and leasing exceeding some thresholds, since most of these losses are likely to have been designed on purpose to reduce the tax burden rather than having been real income losses. We also adjust transfer incomes for the allowance for taxable old-age pensions. Until 2005 only a share of about 30% of the pension (the implicit return of pension payments, the so-called Ertragsanteil) was taxed. For pensioners receiving only small public pensions and no other income, and who therefore had not to file tax returns, the amount of the pension actually received is imputed from matched SOEP data. Likewise, we also add the non-taxable share of life annuity funds. As a result of our adjustments, we obtain a gross income measure which is fairly close to pre tax, post transfer household income. As shown in Table A2 in the web appendix, in 2005, the aggregate gross income recorded in our integrated data base was about 1.8 trillion euros. Excluding capital gains and transfer income, this totaled 1.3 trillion euros, or 82% of total primary household income, as documented by the national accounts statistics. There is very little difference in total wage income between our integrated data base and the 3. For the years 1999-2003, the offsetting of current losses between separate income sources was restricted to 51,500 euros (103,000 euros in the case of jointly assessed married couples) plus half of the remaining total of positive income (see Federal Ministry of Finance, 2002). Since 2004, these current loss-offset restrictions have been replaced by a restriction on the use of loss carryforwards for taxable income exceeding 1 million euros (2 million euros in the case of jointly assessed married couples), from which only a share of 60% is allowed for loss deduction. national accounts; the discrepancy between gross income and income from the national accounts is mainly due to incomes from business and capital. The national accounts determine business income as residual and do not differentiate business and capital income by the categories used for the income tax assessment or recorded by the SOEP. Furthermore, non-profit organizations, which often have substantial capital income, are classified as part of the households sector in the national accounts. The discrepancy between our estimates and those from the national accounts may also be explained by tax-free capital gains and undeclared capital income. Information on the gross income levels of households in the various quantiles of the income distribution is provided in Table A3 in the web appendix. The top percentile begins at a yearly income level of roughly 150,000 euros. In that table we break down the top percentile into smaller groups so as to show its heterogeneity. In the sequel, we refer to the top 0.001% group as the German economic elite. Households in that group received a gross income of at least 11 million euros in 2005. The term super-rich is reserved for the top 0.0001% group, consisting of about 46 households that made at least 58 million euros in 2005. Table A4 in the web appendix reports the distribution of gross income by income components. The top percentile receives about 62% of its income in the form of income from business activities or capital income (including capital gains), 35% in the form of wages, and 3% the in form of transfers. The economic elite and the super-rich, respectively, receive 97% and 98% of their income in the form of income from business activities or capital income.
EFFECTIVE INCOME TAXATION
Tax base erosion
Several provisions in the tax code contribute to tax base erosion, which we define as the ratio of taxable income to gross income. Tax base erosion thus measures the share of total income or some income component actually subject to taxation. Taxable income is obtained by subtracting income-specific expenses, income-specific allowances, special personal expenses, and extraordinary financial burdens from adjusted gross income. Special personal expenses are those not related to a specific income source, such as the allowances for contributions to public or private health or pension insurance funds, educational expenses for one's own children, alimonies, the church tax, and charitable contributions up to certain amounts. Extraordinary financial burdens include distinctive expenses for health care, disability, and child care (for details, see Federal Ministry of Finance, 2002). Furthermore, we deduct child allowances from taxable income. For taxpayers receiving the child benefit instead of the child allowance, this is only an approximation. For them, the correct measure would require adding the difference between the child allowance and the pure transfer component of the child benefit. Since this difference would have to be simulated for part of the population, and we focus on top incomes for which this differentiation is irrelevant, we decided to slightly simplify matters here. Table 1 illustrates the evolution of the ratio of adjusted gross income and taxable income to gross income, respectively. In 2005, adjusted gross income amounted to about 66% of gross income, on average. This share declined modestly during the observation period, from a level of 70% in 1992. A similar decline occurred for the ratio of taxable income to gross income. In 2005 this share was just 51%, which demonstrates the overall importance of tax erosion in Germany. As shown in Table 1 , the erosion of the tax base for the top percentile relative to the remaining taxpayers is small. The relatively high level of tax erosion at the bottom half of the distribution is mainly due to the role played by taxfavored social transfers, basic allowance, and child allowances for that part of the population. The lowest level of the ratio of taxable income to gross income for the top percentile was reached in 1995 when it amounted to about 71%. In 2005, that ratio was almost 81%. For the economic elite and the super-rich this ratio declined by almost 10 percentage points in our observation period.
To gain some insight into the determinants of tax erosion, Table 2 shows the ratio of adjusted gross income to gross income for each income component. 4 Table 2 refers to 2005; Table A5 in the web appendix displays our findings for earlier years. In 2005, the share of wage income subject to taxation amounted to 77.6%, compared to 97.8% for income from business activity and less than 30% for transfer income. The share of taxed wage income is much smaller in the lower part of the gross income distribution than at the top. That is partly driven by the inclusion of employers' social security contributions, which remain untaxed, into our measure of gross income. Due to the existence of an upper social security threshold, this has a small effect at the top of the income distribution, where wages tend to be high. The small share of taxed transfer income in the lower part of the distribution is mainly due to the fact that most of those transfers are public pensions. Those pensions were only taxed according to a portion of the annuity payment.
The fraction of taxed income from interest and dividends is strongly increasing in the level of gross income. Whereas in the lower half of the income distribution less than 30% of income from interest and dividends is taxed, the share is almost 90% for the top percentile. This is mainly caused by the savers allowance for interest and dividend income, which is relatively more important for households with low incomes.
The major source of tax erosion for the top percentile lies in the realm of incomes from renting and leasing. While in 2005 about 58% of income from renting and leasing was taxed in the lower part of the income distribution, only one quarter of incomes from renting and leasing received by the top percentile was subject to taxation. This form of tax erosion is very prominent for the economic elite (top 0.001%) and even more so for the super-rich (top 0.0001%). For those groups, the ratio of adjusted gross income from renting and leasing to gross income from the same source was actually negative. Thanks to generous tax regulations concerning real estate and loopholes in the tax code, the economic elite could transform positive income from renting and leasing into income losses for tax purposes. As Table A5 in the web appendix shows, this form of tax erosion was even more prevalent in the mid and late 1990s. Generous tax regulations introduced especially for investments in East Germany after re-unification caused substantial negative tax revenues from this income source.
Effective tax progressivity
Effective average tax rates are calculated as ratios of income tax to gross income. In a first step the income tax is defined as the sum of the PIT and the solidarity surcharge tax; in a second step we include the burden from the local business tax. Social security contributions are not taken into account when calculating individual tax liabilities because the German social security system is of the Bismarckian variety, strongly relying on the equivalence principle. As first approximation, social security contributions can be viewed as outlays for insurance against individual risks that the individual would have incurred in the absence of mandatory social insurance, as is the case for most self-employed people in Germany. The relationship between contributions and related benefits is especially tight for public pensions, which account for about half of all social security contributions. As explained in Section 3, we adjust for the change in the taxation of dividend income for the years 2002-05 by adding taxes paid on dividend income at the personal as well as the corporate level. Table 3 exhibits the distribution of the burden caused by the PIT and the solidarity surcharge. In 2005, the top percentile contributed almost 27% of the total tax revenue. In the previous years, the share of tax revenue contributed by the top percentile oscillated around 25%, with the remarkable exception of 1995 when tax erosion boomed and their share of tax revenue fell to less than 22%. The distribution of the income tax liabilities across households is highly unequal. In 2005, the tax revenue extracted from the bottom half of the distribution made less than 3% of the total tax revenue, while the top decile contributed more than 60%. The Gini coefficient of the distribution of the tax burden was almost 0.81 in 2005, up from 0.75 in 1992. The already high concentration of the tax burden prevailing in the early nineties has markedly increased since then. Table 3 also records the levels of income tax paid by the various fractiles of the distribution. On average, households in the top percentile paid about 107,000 euros in income tax, measured in 2000 prices. The average tax paid by households belonging to the economic elite was about 11 million euros and the average tax paid by the super-rich was almost 50 million euros.
Personal income tax and solidarity surcharge
When computing effective average tax rates, a decision has to be made about how to account for unclaimed losses carried forward or back (Clark, 2004) . In many cases, those losses are deducted from the tax base and, thus, reduce the tax burden of the current year as reported in the tax statistics. Therefore, when computing the effective tax rate in the respective year, in order to adjust the business income in the denominator, we use information on the loss claims setoff against taxable income that is available in the micro data of the income tax statistics.
Average effective tax rates are presented in the left part of Table 4 and tax rates measured against taxable income are recorded in the right part. In 2005, the effective average tax rate for the entire taxpayer population was 11.3%. The average tax rate was less than 2% for the households in the bottom half of the distribution and almost 9% for households in the upper half of the distribution, excluding the top decile, where it was about 20%. For the top percentile of the income distribution, the effective average tax rate was 30.5%. This rate equals about 2/3 of the average statutory tax rate, inclusive of the solidarity surcharge, that applies to income levels belonging to the top percentile of the distribution.
As shown by Table 4 , up to the top 0.1% group of the income distribution, the German income tax is effectively progressive, i.e., the effective average tax rate increases with gross income. However, tax progression disappears at the top of the income distribution. In 2005, the effective tax rate peaks for the top 0.1% group at a level of almost 34%. The effective tax rate then decreases with income for higher income levels, reaching a level of about 29% for the super-rich. Members of this group, thus, face an effective average tax rate that is similar to the one faced by households that fail to belong to the top percentile. Of course, this is due to the pattern of tax erosion within the top percentile. We now turn to the evolution of effective taxation over time. As shown by Table 4 , effective average taxation of the top percentile has decreased during the period 1992-2005. Thus, while the top percentile has contributed a modestly increasing share of total tax revenue, its effective average tax rate has declined. The higher the income of those in the top percentile, the more prominent this pattern becomes. For the economic elite, the effective average tax rate fell by about 27% between 1992 and 2005, and for the super-rich the decrease was about 34%. The marked decline of effective tax rates at the top of the income distribution mainly occurred after 1998. This was driven by the 2000 tax reform, which cut the top marginal tax rates substantially between 2001 and 2005. 5 Remarkably, average effective tax rates in the top decile of the gross income distribution changed little in this period. Thus, the 2000 tax reform seems to have substantially reduced the effective tax burden at the very top, with small effects on other taxpayers.
The findings reported in Table 4 appear to be quite robust. Findings concerning the top percentile cannot be affected by sampling error since the complete population in the top percentile is observed in our data set. For the top decile, the sampling probability is about 20%. Because of the large sample size, the estimated standard error for the average tax rate of that group in 2005 is only 0.1%. Thus, assuming normally distributed errors, the 95% confidence band of the estimated average tax rate is 19. 8-20.2% in that year.
Adding the local business tax
As mentioned in Section 2, the local business tax paid by sole proprietors and partners of non-incorporated firms can only partially be credited against the PIT liability, and dividend income distributed by domestic corporations is also burdened with local business tax at the company level. Although formally not an income tax proper, the local business tax burden may be added to the nominator when calculating effective tax rates, so as to gain insight about the robustness of the patterns identified above. Table 5 reports effective average tax rates that include the local business tax. For the overall taxpayer population, the inclusion of the local business tax has little effect on effective tax rates. However, since the share of business income strongly increases with gross income, adding the local business tax burden has a considerable effect at the top of the income distribution. For the top percentile, the inclusion of the local business tax burden raises the effective tax rate in 2005 from 30.5% to 34%. Although the inclusion of the local business tax raises the effective tax rates of top incomes by some percentage points, the overall picture does not change much. Effective progressivity breaks down within the top percentile, even when you take the local business tax into account. The same applies to the strong reduction of effective tax rates at the very top of the income distribution. Including the local business tax, the effective tax rate of the economic elite declined by about 23% between 1992 and 2005, and the effective tax rate of the super-rich declined by 35%.
Concentration of net income
In this section, we examine the impact of personal income taxation on the distribution of net income. For the sake of brevity, we neglect the local business tax. As shown by Table 6 , the top percentile received, in 2005, some 10% of total gross income, while its share of total income net of tax was less than 8%. Therefore, income taxation markedly reduces income concentration in Germany. A similar effect can be observed with respect to the higher fractiles within the top percentile.
Since the mid-1990s, the concentration of net income has substantially increased in Germany. As suggested by the left sides of Tables 5 and 6, the rise of concentration can be traced to both the growth of the concentration of gross income and the decline of the effective taxation of top incomes.
The strongest rise of concentration occurred at the very top of the distribution. The share of net income accruing to the economic elite more than doubled between 1992 and 2005, and the super-rich did even better. However, as shown by Table 6 , roughly half of that increase occurred in the last year of our observation period, which is the year in which the top marginal tax rate of the PIT was reduced from 45% to 42%. It is likely that the households at the very top of the Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in Germany In order to assess the order of magnitude of the effect of income shifting, it is useful to examine the evolution of capital gains. Realized capital gains are the income component that can be shifted most easily across different years. They are also distinctly important for the very top of the income distribution: in 2005, capital gains made less than 1% of total gross income for the average household while they represented about 34% of the income of the economic elite. Table A3 in the web appendix reports the evolution of top real gross incomes with and without capital gains. In 2005, the yearly growth rate of income for the economic elite, if capital gains are included, was an astonishing 53%. Their gross income without capital gains grew instead by about 26%. This is consistent with the conjecture that the extraordinary high level of concentration recorded in 2005 is partly due to a short-run income shifting by the rich. However, the evolution of gross income without capital gains reported in Table A3 indicates that capital gains play a relatively modest role in determining how income concentration has evolved during the entire observation period. If capital gains are included, the growth rate of mean real household income for the economic elite in the 1992-2005 period is 123.4%; if capital gains are neglected, that growth rate is still 102.5%. In the same period, overall mean real household income (with capital gains) increased by just 1.1%.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the taxation of households with very high incomes in Germany during the period 1992-2005. Our analysis is based on an integrated dataset that combines data from administrative individual tax returns with a representative household survey, the German SOEP. The distinctive advantage of our dataset is that it allows us to explore the upper tail of the income distribution on the basis of reliable data for the entire population. Since all taxpayers within the top percentile are represented in the data, we can provide a very fine breakdown of the top of the income distribution in Germany, one without any sampling error.
We have found that the effective average tax rate of the top percentile of the German income distribution is 30.5%, i.e., about two thirds of the legislated one. This erosion notwithstanding, the distribution of the tax burden is highly concentrated. In 2005, the top percentile contributed more than a quarter of total income tax proceeds. As a result, the effective average tax rate paid by the top percentile is higher than the one paid by the top decile, which in turn is higher than the one paid by the lower deciles. However, effective tax progression stops at the top percentile. The effective tax rate is not monotonically increasing with gross income within the top percentile of the income distribution and the super-rich are taxed similarly to some households that fail to belong to the top percentile.
The effective average tax rate significantly declined at the very top of the income distribution in the wake of the major PIT reform of the period 2001-05. In terms of taxable income, the tax burden of top incomes declined by more than 10 percentage points, while the tax burden changed little for the average taxpayer in this period. This policy change, along with a sustained boom of top gross incomes, produced a substantial increase in the concentration of net income. The growth of net incomes was quite exceptional for the top 0.001% group of the income distribution, the German economic elite. As a result, net income concentration in Germany was substantially higher in 2005 than in 1992.
After 2005, the German government introduced two prominent measures that still affect the effective taxation of top incomes today. On the one hand, the top marginal tax rate of the PIT was increased by 3 percentage points for yearly taxable incomes larger than 250,000 euros for singles and 500,000 euros for couples. On the other hand, interests and dividends were taken out from the tax base of the PIT and were subjected to a withholding tax at a reduced rate of 25%; at the same time, some formerly tax-free capital gains were made liable to the withholding tax. Given the magnitude of the findings reported in this paper, it appears that those measures, taken together, are extremely unlikely to have reduced the concentration of net incomes to a level close to the one reached at the beginning of our observation period. This suggests that a heavier taxation of top incomes in Germany may be recommendable based on distributional grounds, i.e., if one wants to restore the level of income concentration that prevailed until the mid-1990s, before the above mentioned developments set in. Of course, a heavier taxation of top incomes could also have important fiscal implications. Their assessment requires an investigation of behavioural responses to taxation by households with very high incomes, something that was beyond the scope of this paper. A step in that direction is Bach et al. (2011) , where we offer estimates of the top marginal tax rate of the PIT that would maximize tax revenue in Germany. Verbist, G. (2004) , 'Redistributive effect and progressivity of taxes. An International Comparison across the EU using EUROMOD'. EUROMOD Working Papers em 5/04, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex. Wagstaff, A. and E. van Doorslaer (2001) 
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